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Weil’s Collapse Puts Big Law’s $35 Billion CMBS Footprint in Focus

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Bar chart: CMBS office debt on buildings where each top law firm is a top-five tenant. Kirkland & Ellis $3.7B, Greenberg Traurig $3.5B, McDermott Will $3.0B, Weil Gotshal $2.6B. Total $35 billion across 99 buildings.
Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, November 2026.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges has been in the General Motors Building on Fifth Avenue since the tower opened in 1968. It is still the largest tenant, with 447,075 square feet leased through August 2034, and when the building’s $2.3 billion loan was securitized in 2017 the firm paid 19.4% of its gross rent. That loan, split across BXP 2017-GM and 10 conduit deals, matures in June 2027. With Weil now winding down, the building’s lenders face a refinancing question they did not expect a year ago.

Weil is not an isolated exposure. CRED iQ found top-100 law firms among the five largest tenants in 99 office buildings backing $35.4 billion of CMBS debt in 192 deals. In 34 of them, carrying $15.9 billion, a law firm is the single largest tenant. The 69 firms occupy 16.5 million square feet in these buildings, and 55% of the debt is in New York.

Weil’s footprint shows how one firm can reach several deals. In Dallas it is a top tenant at The Crescent, refinanced in March through CRSNT 2026-MOON. It had signed an early renewal there at $54 per square foot, triple net, from August 2028 to 2039: a 67% increase over its in-place rent of $32.21.

Law firmBuildingsFirm’s space (sf)CMBS debt on those buildings
Kirkland & Ellis51,145,234$3.7B
Greenberg Traurig5235,989$3.5B
McDermott Will & Schulte2206,564$3.0B
Weil, Gotshal & Manges2518,801$2.6B
Paul Hastings4456,395$2.2B
Seyfarth Shaw3353,682$1.9B
Cravath, Swaine & Moore1519,415$1.9B
Debevoise & Plimpton1530,722$1.8B
Sidley Austin3173,323$1.6B
Jones Day5726,997$1.3B
Top-100 law firms with the most CMBS office exposure, by debt on buildings where the firm is a top-five tenant

The Trophy Towers Are Locked Up

Big Law’s newest leases run longer than the loans. Cravath, Swaine & Moore’s 519,415 square feet at Two Manhattan West runs to 2044, nearly eight years past the maturity of its $1.9 billion loan. Debevoise & Plimpton has 530,722 square feet at The Spiral through 2042, McDermott Will is One Vanderbilt’s largest tenant through 2042, and Paul, Weiss leases 765,956 square feet at 1345 Avenue of the Americas through 2047, 20 years after that loan matures.

Where the Lease Runs Out First

In 24 buildings carrying $5.8 billion, a top-100 firm’s lease expires before the loan matures. Ropes & Gray’s 345,413 square feet at 1211 Avenue of the Americas expire in March 2027, 17 months before the building’s $1.04 billion loan comes due. At 425 Lexington Avenue, the lender has trapped cash since the loan closed this year because Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, with 642,838 square feet, plans to leave when its lease ends in 2033.

Chart comparing law firm lease expirations with CMBS loan maturities at 15 office towers
Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, November 2026.

Fewer Defaults, Bigger Holes

Law-firm buildings default less often. 19 of them, with $3.2 billion of debt, are in special servicing: 9.0% of the balance, against 15.8% for CMBS office loans overall. But when a firm leaves, the hole is large. At the New York Times Building, Covington & Burling’s 197,450 square feet sit vacant; the $635 million loan defaulted at its December 2025 maturity, and Datadog has a right of first offer on the space. In Los Angeles, Skadden’s 107,058-square-foot lease at One California Plaza was set to end in November 2024, the month the loan failed to pay off at maturity. A receiver now runs the tower, which is 55.1% occupied.

Keeping the firms does not guarantee a healthy loan. At 51 W. 52nd St., Wachtell, Lipton extended to 2034 and Orrick expanded and extended to 2038, yet the loan is with a special servicer at 0.64 times debt-service coverage. In San Francisco, Kirkland & Ellis is the largest tenant at 555 California Street through 2030, but the building is 74.3% occupied, coverage fell to 0.47 times in June and the $1.2 billion loan matures in May 2027.

BuildingCityLaw firm tenant(s)Lease endCMBS loanLoan maturityStatus
One VanderbiltNew YorkMcDermott Will (199,320 sf); Greenberg Traurig12/2042$3.0B7/2031Current
General Motors BuildingNew YorkWeil Gotshal (447,075 sf)8/2034$2.3B6/2027Current
Two Manhattan WestNew YorkCravath (519,415 sf)3/2044$1.9B6/2036Current
The SpiralNew YorkDebevoise (530,722 sf)10/2042$1.8B1/2030Current
555 California St.San FranciscoKirkland & Ellis (274,765 sf)9/2030$1.2B5/2027Watchlist
200 Park Ave.New YorkGibson Dunn; Paul Hastings; Winston & Strawn (237,360 sf)8/2027 (Winston)$1.1B2/2035Current
1211 Avenue of the AmericasNew YorkRopes & Gray (345,413 sf)3/2027$1.0B8/2028Current
1345 Avenue of the AmericasNew YorkPaul, Weiss (765,956 sf)6/2047$650M6/2027Watchlist
New York Times BuildingNew YorkCovington (197,450 sf, vacant); Seyfarth Shaw9/2027$635M12/2025Special servicing
51 W. 52nd St.New YorkWachtell (252,270 sf); Orrick7/2034$386M10/2027Special servicing
425 Lexington Ave.New YorkSimpson Thacher (642,838 sf)10/2033$352M7/2028Watchlist (cash trap)
One California PlazaLos AngelesSkadden (107,058 sf); Locke Lord11/2024$287M11/2024Special servicing
Notable CMBS office loans with a top-100 law firm among the largest tenants

The Takeaway

Law firms sign long leases and pay their rent, which is why these buildings default less often. The risk is concentration: 27 of the buildings, with $10.5 billion of debt, have loans maturing by the end of 2027, the GM Building among them. Lenders will be asking whether the anchor firm is staying, moving to a new tower or, like Weil, going away.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, November 2026. Conduit and SASB/large-loan CMBS office loans outstanding as of the October 2026 remittance. Law firms = the 100 largest firms by revenue (2025 Global 200 ranking), matched to the five largest tenants reported for each property. CMBS debt = balance of the CMBS loans secured by each building, allocated by property for portfolio loans. Lease terms from servicer reports and offering documents; loan details from servicer commentary.

CMBS Distress Shifts Away From New York

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Bar chart: change in CMBS distress rate over the past year in the 15 largest metros, October 2025 to October 2026. Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston rose; New York fell to 11.2%.
Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026.

2400 Market Street in Philadelphia is 99.5% occupied, and its largest tenant, Aramark, has a lease that runs to 2034. The $205 million loan on the building still moved to a special servicer on Sept. 29 for imminent default ahead of its Dec. 9 maturity. The servicer is pursuing a modification.

In October alone, CRED iQ’s property alerts flagged $4.5 billion of conduit and single-asset (SASB) CMBS debt as newly delinquent or newly in special servicing, and 93% of it was past maturity or within six months of it. Office made up $1.5 billion, hotels $1.1 billion, retail $0.7 billion and industrial $0.5 billion.

The national rate is creeping up: 11.2% of the $617 billion of conduit and SASB loans in the October remittance was delinquent, past maturity or with a special servicer, against 10.9% a year earlier. The map moved more. New York fell to 11.2% from 12.5%, while Los Angeles rose to 14.6% from 9.4%, Chicago to 23.5% from 19.5% and Houston to 15.3% from 12.4%.

MetroCMBS balanceDistress rateA year agoChange (bp)Office distress
Chicago$22.1B23.5%19.5%+39832.6%
Philadelphia$12.0B23.0%21.3%+16637.4%
San Francisco$23.2B17.5%19.8%-2315.8%
Houston$14.1B15.3%12.4%+29031.5%
Los Angeles$33.3B14.6%9.4%+51121.5%
Seattle$11.9B13.0%12.4%+6221.3%
Washington, D.C.$22.1B12.5%10.6%+19219.7%
New York$147.0B11.2%12.5%-12912.7%
San Jose$9.6B7.2%4.7%+2465.7%
Atlanta$16.5B7.0%6.7%+2717.1%
Boston$18.3B6.2%4.2%+2052.7%
Dallas-Fort Worth$16.5B6.1%6.6%-4820.3%
Phoenix$9.9B5.0%4.9%+715.0%
Miami$19.9B3.1%5.6%-2513.3%
Las Vegas$22.0B2.8%2.5%+291.6%
CMBS distress rate in the 15 largest metros, October 2026 (conduit and SASB, by outstanding balance)

New York Is Improving, but Its Maturities Keep Missing

New York’s October alerts were maturity failures. The Essex, a $117 million loan on a mostly residential Manhattan building, went to a special servicer after the borrower said it could not repay at its Oct. 30 maturity. The $100 million 60 Madison Avenue loan, on an office building 58% occupied at year-end, passed its Oct. 6 maturity as the borrower seeks an extension. Across the river, the $250 million loan on 101 Hudson Street in Jersey City, 65% occupied, went unpaid at its Oct. 11 maturity.

Office Trouble Spreads to L.A., Chicago and Houston

Office is 16.4% distressed nationally and 44% of all distressed balance. In Los Angeles, where office distress more than doubled to 21.5% from 9.9%, the $74 million Equitable Plaza loan missed its extended Oct. 6 maturity; the tower was last valued at $57.7 million, against $150.5 million at origination. Chicago office distress is 32.6%, and the $54 million Executive Towers West loan in suburban Downers Grove, 63% occupied, went to a special servicer. Houston office distress rose to 31.5% from 21.9%, and the strain is reaching last year’s loans: three Houston apartment loans made in 2025, $93.5 million in all, went 30 days delinquent in October.

Warehouses, Malls and Hotels Hit Their Maturity Dates

Industrial is not exempt. The $321 million LBA 2024-7IND loan, on warehouses in 10 states, matured Oct. 9 without being repaid; an extension is in process. The $325 million Fresno Fashion Fair loan went 30 days delinquent ahead of its Nov. 1 maturity, even though the mall is 97.6% occupied. A $746 million loan on more than 70 select-service hotels (THPT 2023-THL) was transferred for imminent default ahead of a Dec. 6 maturity.

Property typeConduitSASBCMBS totalCMBS a year agoCRE CLO
Office20.2%12.9%16.4%14.7%19.2%
Mixed-use14.7%12.7%13.8%14.5%10.7%
Retail10.0%12.4%10.8%10.0%1.5%
Lodging11.0%9.3%9.9%9.2%5.5%
Multifamily9.4%7.9%8.7%9.3%6.3%
Industrial3.5%1.0%1.9%2.8%0.9%
All12.6%9.8%11.2%10.9%6.5%
Distress rate by property type and deal type, October 2026

CRE CLOs: A Clean Headline, a Troubled Legacy Book

CRE CLO distress is 6.5% overall but 34.8% in the 17 CLOs left from 2021 and 2022, where 71% of the balance has been modified. Matured CLO loans tend to stay out of special servicing: of the 18 CLO loans flagged in October, 16 were delinquencies at or near maturity and only 2 were transfers, both notes on Tides at Wynn Palms in Las Vegas: $98 million across two 2022 MF1 deals, modified in 2025 and now covering debt service 0.50 times.

The Takeaway

Full occupancy is no protection, as 2400 Market and Fresno Fashion Fair show. The test is whether a loan can be refinanced at today’s rates and values, and in October it was failing in Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston as well as New York.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics and CRED iQ Property Alerts, October 2026. Conduit and SASB/large-loan CMBS, October 2026 remittance versus October 2025 (deals whose October file has not yet loaded use their September data); CRE CLO shown separately; agency deals and defeased loans excluded. Distress = balance 30+ days delinquent, past maturity (performing or not) or in special servicing, as a share of outstanding balance. Portfolio loans allocated to metros by property. New alerts = loans newly delinquent or newly transferred to special servicing, alerts dated Oct. 1 – Oct. 29, 2026. Loan details from servicer commentary.

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The Power of One: Why SASB Outruns Conduits 3 to 1

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Area chart of cumulative CMBS issuance in 2026 versus 2025, Single Asset, Single Borrower (SASB/Large Loan) versus conduit. SASB is 76% of private-label issuance through September 2026, about 3 times conduit volume, tracking 2025's pace.
Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026.

In February, one loan on The Cosmopolitan of Las Vegas became a $3.05 billion bond deal on its own. No conduit priced this year came close: the biggest, BMARK 2026-V21, pooled 49 loans into $1.20 billion. Fifteen single-borrower and large-loan deals were bigger than that.

That is the market in 2026. Through September, single-asset, single-borrower (SASB) and large-loan deals totaled $66.0 billion, against $21.2 billion of conduits: $3.12 for every conduit dollar, and 76% of private-label CMBS issuance. Combined volume of $87.2 billion is up 2% from the same months of 2025, with SASB up 1% and conduits up 6%. SASB out-issued conduits in every month of the year.

Deal type2026 deals2026 volume2025 deals2025 volumeChange
SASB / large loan95$66.0B91$65.2B+1%
Conduit28$21.2B27$20.0B+6%
Total123$87.2B118$85.2B+2%
Private-label CMBS issuance, January through September

It wasn’t always this way. In the first nine months of 2017, 2019, 2020 and 2023, conduits out-issued single-borrower deals, and SASB’s share was 42% in 2017. Conduit volume has stayed in a narrow band, $13 billion to $28 billion in each January-to-September stretch, while SASB volume has more than doubled. SASB surges in strong years (2021, 2024 onward) and retreats in weak ones: its share fell to 37% in 2020 and 47% in 2023.

The biggest SASB deals read like a list of the country’s marquee assets. After The Cosmopolitan come a $2.1 billion Jersey City multifamily portfolio, a $2.05 billion QTS data center portfolio financed by nine banks, and $1.9 billion on Two Manhattan West. Manhattan office and mixed-use towers, including 9 West 57th Street, One Madison Avenue and 10 Hudson Yards, fill out the top ten.

Where the Money Went

The two channels finance different buildings. Conduits remain the home of everyday collateral: multifamily is 26% of conduit balance and retail 13%, spread across 1,067 loans averaging $20 million. SASB money goes to trophy assets and big portfolios. Office is still the largest SASB property type at 19% of balance, but SASB office volume fell to $12.5 billion from $22.4 billion a year earlier, and SASB retail halved to $5.1 billion. Apartments and hotels took up the slack: SASB multifamily rose to $10.0 billion from $2.9 billion and hotels to $11.3 billion from $8.8 billion, while data centers reached $6.2 billion, 9% of SASB balance. Across both channels, multifamily’s share more than doubled to 18% from 8%, while retail fell to 9% from 16%.

Structure differs too: 60% of SASB balance is floating-rate, while conduit loans are fixed, 90% of them interest-only, at a weighted average coupon of 6.43%.

Property typeSASB / large loanConduitAll 2026All 2025
Office19%17%18%30%
Multifamily15%26%18%8%
Hotel17%12%16%13%
Industrial13%10%12%14%
Mixed use11%10%11%7%
Retail8%13%9%16%
Data center9%0%7%6%
Self storage3%5%4%3%
Manufactured housing0%4%1%1%
Other5%4%5%1%
2026 property mix by deal type, share of balance (January through September)

The Originator Leaderboard

Seven banks write most of it. Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo and Citi lead CRED iQ’s 2026 ranking of loans contributed to conduit and SASB deals, and the top seven account for 80% of the attributed volume. Goldman Sachs originated $12.0 billion, $10.1 billion of it in SASB deals. Citi led conduit lending with $2.6 billion. The ranking has barely moved from 2025: the same eight banks make the top eight, with Citi climbing to third and Morgan Stanley slipping to fifth.

RankOriginatorTotalSASBConduitDeals2025 rank
1Goldman Sachs$12.0B$10.1B$1.9B492
2Wells Fargo$11.8B$9.5B$2.3B461
3Citi$9.8B$7.2B$2.6B314
4JPMorgan$8.6B$7.2B$1.4B365
5Morgan Stanley$8.3B$6.5B$1.8B333
6Bank of America$6.8B$5.0B$1.8B286
7Deutsche Bank$5.9B$4.3B$1.6B267
8Barclays$3.6B$2.0B$1.5B238
2026 originator leaderboard, conduit and SASB loans (January through September)

The Takeaway

Issuance is running slightly ahead of last year, and SASB still sets the pace with three of every four private-label dollars. What has changed is the collateral: less office and retail, more apartments, hotels and data centers. Conduits keep financing the broad middle of the market, one $20 million loan at a time, but the big money in 2026 is moving one asset at a time.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026. Private-label CMBS: conduit and single-asset, single-borrower / large-loan deals that closed January through September of each year, measured at the deal’s initial loan balance; CRE CLO, Freddie Mac and single-family rental deals excluded. Originator credit is split equally among co-originators on each loan.

1/3 of Maturing Apartment Debt Needs a Cash Infusion to Refinance

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After September’s rate hike, $6.8 billion of fresh equity stands between maturing multifamily loans and a refinance. Loans written at 2021 and 2022’s low coupons are the hardest hit.

20 Exchange Place, a 54-story, 767-unit apartment tower near Wall Street built in 1929, was 94% occupied in the second quarter, and its loan is current. But the $246 million Freddie Mac loan behind it carries a 4.01% coupon and matures in February 2027. The property’s 2025 net operating income of $15.5 million would support a new loan of about $183 million at today’s agency rates, leaving a gap of roughly $63 million. The borrower has been calling capital from investors as needed to cover operating shortfalls, according to servicer commentary.

That arithmetic is now common. CRED iQ re-sized every multifamily loan in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and commercial mortgage-backed securities deals maturing between October 2026 and December 2028, $136 billion in all, at current new-issue coupons plus September’s rate hike. Nearly one in four (23%) of those loans, and 31% of the balance, could not refinance without new equity. Borrowers would need to bring $6.8 billion to the table. The median shortfall is 15% of the loan, or about $25,000 per apartment.

What the Hike Did

The Secured Overnight Financing Rate jumped from 3.62% to 3.85% on Sept. 17. Passed through to permanent loan coupons, the hike pushed 178 more loans ($4.0 billion of balance) below a 1.25x coverage test and added $846 million to the equity gap. Each further 25 basis points adds roughly $1.0 billion more. Two more hikes would leave 39% of maturing multifamily debt short of a refinance.

ScenarioCoupon, conduit / Freddie / FannieLoans shortBalance shortEquity needed
Before Sept. hike6.21% / 5.21% / 5.34%21%28%$6.0B
After hike (+25 bp)6.46% / 5.46% / 5.59%23%31%$6.8B
One more (+50 bp)6.71% / 5.71% / 5.84%26%35%$7.7B
Two more (+75 bp)6.96% / 5.96% / 6.09%29%39%$8.8B
Three more (+100 bp)7.21% / 6.21% / 6.34%32%42%$9.8B
Rate scenarios: multifamily debt maturing October 2026 to December 2028 that needs new equity to refinance

The 2021-2022 Problem

The gap is concentrated in loans written at the bottom of the rate cycle. Loans originated in 2021 and 2022, with a median coupon of 3.35%, now face refinancing rates roughly two to three percentage points higher. Some 46% of them, and 57% of their balance, need new equity, against 15% of the loans written in 2016 to 2018, which had years of rent growth to catch up with higher rates. Income is the other half of the story: loans that clear the test have grown net operating income a median 31% since underwriting, while those that fall short have seen it drop a median 12%.

OriginatedMaturing balanceMedian couponLoans shortBalance shortEquity needed
2016-2018$70.1B4.37%15%19%$2.6B
2019-2020$10.3B3.46%33%46%$0.8B
2021-2022$18.5B3.35%46%57%$1.9B
2023-2025$21.0B5.78%38%44%$1.4B
By origination year: maturing multifamily loans that need new equity after the hike

Where the Gap Is Widest

Among the largest markets, Western and Sunbelt metros lead. In San Francisco, 70% of maturing multifamily debt falls short; in Atlanta, 55%; in Denver, 51%. Chicago (13%) and Los Angeles (24%) are at the other end.

MetroMaturing balanceLoans shortBalance shortEquity needed
San Francisco$4.0B47%70%$603M
Atlanta$3.9B44%55%$398M
Denver$3.9B51%51%$368M
Phoenix$3.9B40%46%$299M
Dallas-Fort Worth$5.2B34%42%$478M
Seattle$3.6B32%40%$223M
New York$10.8B33%39%$739M
Houston$3.7B30%37%$200M
Washington, D.C.$4.4B31%33%$231M
San Diego$3.2B24%33%$140M
Los Angeles$8.4B25%24%$352M
Chicago$4.1B17%13%$68M
Largest metros: maturing multifamily debt that needs new equity after the hike

New York’s Park West Village shows how fast a gap can open. The 850-unit property’s loan, split across seven conduit deals, was underwritten at 1.34x coverage; by year-end 2025 coverage was 0.61x as expenses rose, according to servicer commentary. It was modified by the special servicer last November and matures in August 2027.

The Takeaway

Most maturing multifamily loans still refinance on their own. But for the 2021 and 2022 class, a refinance now means a check, and every additional hike makes it bigger. Expect more paydowns, extensions and rescue capital through 2028.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026. Multifamily loans in Fannie Mae DUS MBS, Freddie Mac K and SB deals, and conduit and fixed-rate SASB CMBS maturing October 2026 to December 2028; floating-rate SASB, CRE CLO and co-op loans excluded. Refinance sized at 1.25x debt service coverage on a 30-year amortization at the average coupon on 2026 multifamily new issuance (6.21% conduit and SASB, 5.21% Freddie Mac, 5.34% Fannie Mae) plus 25 basis points, using 2025 net operating income. September 2026 numbers are preliminary.

Insurance Is Taking a Bigger Bite Out of Apartment Revenue

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In 2019, a Louisiana apartment property financed in a CMBS or Freddie K deal spent about $4.77 on insurance for every $100 of revenue it collected. By 2025, that figure was $9.42, and that is after premiums fell last year.

That is the shape of the apartment insurance story. After five straight years of increases, insurance costs on apartment properties fell 2.2% in 2025, according to CRED iQ’s same-store analysis of property operating statements. That followed a 28.5% jump in 2023. But the relief came off a much higher base: apartment insurance costs are still more than double their 2019 level.

The pressure has clearly eased. In 2023, 46% of apartment properties saw their premiums rise more than 20%. In 2025, 24% did, and 36% paid less than the year before.

The Sunbelt Turned First

The markets with the sharpest run-up are the ones now getting relief. Florida apartment premiums rose 2.5-fold between 2019 and 2024, including a 46% jump in 2023 alone. In 2025 they fell 9.8%. Texas apartments fell 8.4% and Louisiana apartments 10.5%. Nearly two-thirds of Florida apartment properties paid less than a year earlier, as did 57% in Texas and 58% in Louisiana.

The decline has continued into 2026. In the first half of the year, 59% of apartment properties paid less for insurance than in the first half of 2025, up from 38% a year earlier. In the Sunbelt, 72% paid less, and the typical premium fell 11%.

202320242025
Louisiana apartments262265237
Florida apartments239255230
Texas apartments231243223
California apartments205236251
New York apartments166192201
Sunbelt apartments223239221
Coastal metro apartments187216226
All apartments199220215
Same-store apartment insurance cost index (2019 = 100)

The Coasts Are Still Climbing

Coastal apartment owners have not shared in the relief. Premiums on apartments in major coastal metros rose 4.8% in 2025, and California apartments rose 6.3%. California has now passed Florida on cumulative growth since 2019, with an index of 251 against Florida’s 230, and coastal apartments overall (226) have passed the Sunbelt (221).

Rents Never Kept Up

The bigger problem for owners is that revenue did not keep pace. On the same properties, apartment revenue per unit rose 27% from 2019 to 2025, from $14,210 to $19,292 a year. Insurance per unit rose 115%, from $339 to $778. Nationally, insurance now takes $4.02 of every $100 of apartment revenue, up from $2.39 in 2019. Insurance outran rent in every one of the 30 states we measured, led by Louisiana, California, Oregon, Washington and Texas.

State20192025Change
Louisiana$4.77$9.42+97%
California$1.63$3.12+91%
Oregon$1.49$2.77+86%
Texas$2.92$5.37+84%
Washington$1.60$2.95+84%
Georgia$2.34$4.07+74%
Florida$3.21$5.55+73%
New York$2.60$4.37+68%
Michigan$2.71$3.39+25%
United States$2.39$4.02+68%
Insurance cost per $100 of apartment revenue, same properties

2025 Was a Turning Point

Last year was the first since 2019 in which apartment revenue grew faster than insurance: revenue rose 1.4% while insurance costs fell about 2%. In the Sunbelt, apartment revenue was flat, but insurance fell 7.2%, or $65 million. As a result, net operating income fell 1.4% instead of 2.1%.

For lenders, the Sunbelt relief is real and arrives as loans head toward 2027 and 2028 refinancings. But insurance costs for Sunbelt apartments are still more than double their 2019 level, and on the coasts they are still rising. The spike is over. The higher costs stayed.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026. Same-store analysis of property operating statements for apartment properties securing CMBS and Freddie K loans: each year compares the same properties’ annual insurance cost and revenue with the prior year, chained to 2019 = 100. 2025 and first-half 2026 figures are preliminary.

Postseason CMBS: Does Good Baseball Mean Good Real Estate?

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Both Chicago teams made October. Chicago’s office towers didn’t. How commercial real estate is holding up in the 11 playoff metros.

In July, the $536 million loan on Chicago’s Aon Center reached maturity and wasn’t repaid. The tower, appraised at $824 million when the loan was securitized, is now valued at $195 million. A three-year extension request “was unequivocally denied,” according to servicer commentary.

Chicago is the weakest real estate market in this year’s postseason. As of August, 25.3% of Chicago’s outstanding CMBS balance was delinquent or in special servicing, according to CRED iQ. That is the highest of the 11 playoff metros and up 4.7 percentage points in a year.

Nationally, the CMBS distress rate was 10.9% in August, down from 11.5% a year earlier. Preliminary September numbers point to a similar 10.8%. The steady headline masks office, which accounts for 45.5% of distressed balance and whose distress rate climbed to 16.0%. Office is the top source of distress in eight of the 11 playoff metros.

MetroTeam(s)Distress RateChange vs. Aug 2025Primary Driver
San DiegoPadres0.3%−0.8 ptsNone (all types under 2%)
BostonRed Sox5.6%+0.1 ptsMixed-use / life science
TampaRays6.0%−1.4 ptsRetail
AtlantaBraves7.5%−6.7 ptsOffice
New YorkYankees9.6%−2.9 ptsOffice
Los AngelesDodgers11.8%+3.5 ptsOffice
HoustonAstros16.0%+3.3 ptsOffice
PhiladelphiaPhillies16.3%−0.2 ptsOffice
MilwaukeeBrewers22.4%+2.7 ptsOffice
ClevelandGuardians22.5%+2.4 ptsOffice
ChicagoCubs, White Sox25.3%+4.7 ptsOffice
U.S. CMBS10.9%−0.5 ptsOffice
CMBS distress by playoff metro, August 2026

The bottom of the bracket

Cleveland (22.5%) and Milwaukee (22.4%) join Chicago at the bottom. In Cleveland, $414 million of distressed debt sits within a mile of Progressive Field, led by Key Center, in special servicing since 2020. Milwaukee’s distress centers on Southridge Mall, where the value has fallen 74%.

The middle innings

Philadelphia (16.3%) is weighed down by three loans on Market Street West, at 1500, 1700 and 1818 Market, totaling $779 million and 40% of the metro’s distress. Houston (16.0%) rose 3.3 points as One & Three Allen Center, a $470 million loan on a 71%-occupied complex, moved to special servicing and six apartment loans became distressed this summer. Los Angeles (11.8%) jumped in August when the $1.1 billion ICON/Hollywood Media Portfolio loan transferred ahead of maturity; 20 LA loans totaling $2.5 billion became distressed this summer.

The comeback stories

New York’s rate fell 2.9 points to 9.6% as $6.1 billion of loans cured, including 1211 Avenue of the Americas ($1.035 billion) and One New York Plaza ($810 million). Worldwide Plaza, with its value down 74%, remains the biggest problem. Atlanta fell to 7.5% from 14.2%, helped by the payoff of a $580 million hotel portfolio loan.

The top seeds

San Diego is the cleanest market in the postseason at 0.3% distressed, with the Hotel del Coronado and a 98%-occupied Fashion Valley mall among its largest loans. In Tampa (6.0%), one asset, the 27%-occupied Westfield Countryside mall, accounts for 62% of distress. Boston (5.6%) is dominated by a single life-science loan that remains current.

The takeaway

The national rate is an average of very different markets. Midwestern office cores are still deteriorating, New York is healing, and in the healthiest cities a few buildings decide the score. For lenders, the question isn’t who wins the pennant. It’s which loans come due next.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, August 2026. Conduit and SASB/SBLL CMBS. Distress rate is the share of outstanding balance that is delinquent or in special servicing. September 2026 figures are preliminary.

Office Special Servicing Hits a New High as More Loans Transfer Before Default

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Office distress reaches new highs. The office CMBS delinquency rate reached 13.2% in August 2026, the highest reading since at least 2019 and up from 8.1% in July 2024. That is roughly 1.6 times the 8.2% rate across all property types. The figure includes performing matured loans; excluding them, office delinquency stands at 9.8%. The special servicing rate climbed to 15.7%, also the highest since at least 2019, up from 14.9% a year earlier and 10.6% in July 2024. The figures cover $189.6 billion of office debt across conduit, single-asset single-borrower and CRE CLO deals.

The climb slowed, then resumed. Most of the increase came between mid-2024 and mid-2025. From September 2025 through July 2026, office delinquency held between 11.5% and 12.5% before jumping in August. Of the deals that have reported so far in September, delinquency is running above 14% and special servicing above 16%. Conduit office remains the weakest segment at 14.4% delinquent and 18.5% in special servicing, compared with 10.7% and 11.5% for single-asset single-borrower office. Maturity remains the main driver: 71% of distressed office balance is tied to a failed or imminent refinancing rather than missed payments.

Distress is arriving earlier. Over the past 12 months, 51% of office loans transferred to special servicing were still current at transfer, a median of about 11 months ahead of maturity, up from 42% in the prior 12 months. Borrowers and master servicers are increasingly moving loans before a payment is missed or a balloon date passes. One SoHo Square, backed by roughly $469 million of CMBS notes, transferred in late August while current, nearly two years before its 2028 maturity.

The writing was on the wall. Whether that is premature shows up in what happened next. CRED iQ tracked the 93 office loans that transferred while current and ahead of maturity between August 2024 and August 2025. Through August 2026, 72% went 60 or more days delinquent or matured without paying off at some point. As of August, 43% were still delinquent or matured unpaid, and only 15% had returned to the master servicer and were current. Among loans already delinquent at transfer, the share that reached serious delinquency was 92%. A loan that looks healthy at transfer has proven only modestly safer than one that has already stopped paying.

Full buildings are not immune. Several failed refinancings involve fully leased, single-tenant properties. Crossroads III in Sunnyvale, a $209 million loan on a 100% leased property with Apple as its largest tenant, was extended once, went to special servicing in August and received a notice of default on September 1. In Rockville, Maryland, the $138 million GSK R&D Centre loan transferred ahead of its 2027 maturity as its sole tenant vacated, even though the property still reports full occupancy.

Large loans are the exception. Among current-at-transfer loans under $100 million, 74% went on to default at some point, and 11% were back with the master servicer by August. Among loans of $100 million or more, the default rate was lower at 63%, and about a third had returned to the master servicer by August, some after a period of default. Willis Tower and 1211 Avenue of the Americas both transferred while current and have since returned to the master servicer. For larger loans, an early transfer appears to work more as an entry point to a restructuring than as a precursor to foreclosure.

Why no one is waiting. The 2015 and 2016 vintages explain the caution. Ten-year office loans from those years paid off at maturity at 47% and 44% by balance, compared with 79% and 76% for other property types. Distress in the 2016 office vintage jumped 35 percentage points in a year to 51% of balance. In downtown Indianapolis, Salesforce Tower and PNC Center, both originated on the same day in August 2016, matured on the same day, September 1. PNC Center went to special servicing days earlier and is now non-performing matured; Salesforce Tower is performing matured.

What comes next. About $39 billion of office CMBS matures over the next 12 months. Of that, $13.9 billion is not yet distressed but already shows warning signs: debt service coverage below 1.25x, occupancy down 10 or more points from securitization, or a recent watchlist addition. The largest include 3 Bryant Park ($1.13 billion, watchlisted in May) and 280 Park Avenue ($1.08 billion, debt service coverage of 0.72x). If the past two years are a guide, many of these loans will reach special servicing well before they miss a payment.

Data reflects CRED iQ’s coverage of conduit, single-asset single-borrower and CRE CLO office loans as of August 2026 remittances. Delinquency includes performing matured loans. Outcomes for loans that left reporting are inferred from their last reported status. Initial maturity dates on floating-rate loans with extension options may overstate near-term maturities.

About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is a commercial real estate data and analytics platform providing loan-level insight across CMBS, agency and private-label CRE loan portfolios, helping lenders, investors and servicers monitor performance, valuation and risk.

CRED iQ Launches PRISM: Unit-Level Multifamily Rent Analytics

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New API-first product structures asking rents, floor plans, square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and amenities for over one million multifamily properties, refreshed weekly

PHILADELPHIA, PA — CRED iQ, the commercial real estate data and analytics company, today announced PRISM, a multifamily unit analytics product that turns publicly advertised rental listings into structured, property-level data. PRISM covers more than one million deduplicated multifamily properties drawn from more than 1.5 million public listings, refreshes weekly, and is delivered through a REST API, bulk data feeds, and an MCP server for AI workflows.

PRISM addresses a familiar problem for appraisers, lenders, investors, and developers: multifamily rent comparables still get assembled by hand, one listing site at a time. PRISM does that work at national scale and returns the result as clean tables keyed to a single property ID. For each property, subscribers receive public asking rents by unit type, from studios through four-bedroom units, with minimum, maximum, and midpoint values; floor plans with bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage, and unit counts; availability and lease terms as published; structured amenities and ratings; and HUD enrichment including year built, total units, inspection scores, and subsidy flags. A source map records every listing that contributed to a record, so each rent can be traced back to where it was publicly advertised.

“PRISM is a benchmarking dataset. It shows what the market is asking, unit by unit, and hands it to you as an API so your appraisal, underwriting, or market study can move at the speed of your own workflow,” said Michael Haas, Chief Executive Officer of CRED iQ. “PRISM was designed around a set of principles that our clients, prospects and our own analysts believe the multifamily industry needs.”

PRISM extends CRED iQ’s existing coverage of the securitized commercial real estate market into the broader multifamily rental universe. The product is built on the same API-first architecture CRED iQ has used since 2019 to deliver loan, property, and valuation data to lenders, investors, servicers, rating agencies, and researchers.

Availability: PRISM is available now in early access. Professionals and firms can request an API trial at pages.cred-iq.com/prism. Delivery options include a REST API, scheduled bulk data feeds, and an MCP server for use with AI agents. Enterprise and data-licensing inquiries can be directed to info@cred-iq.com.

About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is the enterprise data and intelligence platform powering the securitized commercial real estate market — spanning CMBS, SASB, CRE CLO, and GSE/Agency Multifamily. Delivered via web platform, API, bulk feeds, and MCP server, CRED iQ is the data provider of choice for institutional market participants and the canonical data layer for AI-driven CRE workflows. Learn more at www.cred-iq.com.

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State of Conduit CMBS: Multifamily and Office Stay Levered, While Other Property Types Provide More Equity

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The latest conduit CMBS data reveal a lending market that has grown more selective, not more cautious. Rates broadly eased over the past year, yet borrowers in most property types are being asked to bring more equity to the table than they were twelve months ago. Multifamily and office are the exceptions, for different reasons, and increasingly the exceptions that define the cycle.

Source: CRED iQ, conduit new issue data, June–August 2025 vs. June–August 2026. Figures are note-amount-weighted averages.

Multifamily is the sector where issuers extended more credit on better terms. LTV climbed to 62.0%, up 2.2 points and the highest of any property type, while the rate on those loans fell the most in the entire sample, down a full half-point to 6.0%. Debt yield actually dropped slightly, meaning borrowers are covering less cushion per dollar borrowed even as leverage rose. That is about as clean a vote of confidence as a lending market gives.

Office also gained leverage, but the mechanics look different. LTV rose 3.3 points, to 49.5%, yet DSCR fell by more than two tenths of a turn, to 1.94x, and debt yield ticked up rather than down. Issuers are willing to lend more against office collateral, but they’re pricing that leverage with thinner coverage and a smaller margin for error, a bet that office cash flows have stabilized enough to underwrite more aggressively, not a wholesale return of confidence in the sector.

Everywhere else, the ask went the other direction, and more sharply. Retail’s LTV fell 10.2 points, to 47.8%, while its debt yield jumped 8.1 points, to 20.3%, the single largest swing in the table. Self-storage and industrial told a similar story: leverage down 6 to 10 points, debt yield and DSCR both up. None of these sectors are in distress; DSCR actually improved in each case. But issuers are structuring deals that require meaningfully more sponsor equity than they did a year ago, even as the underlying cost of debt got a little cheaper.

Hotel remains the market’s most watched holdout. Its debt yield, at 22.4%, is the highest of any category by a wide margin, and it rose again this year even as rate and LTV both eased at the edges. Lenders are still pricing in more downside than the headline rate suggests.

The blended LTV held flat at 55.6% both years, but that’s an artifact of mix, not stability. Multifamily’s share of loan count rose from roughly 31% to 43%. Strip that shift out, and the underlying message is unambiguous: capital is concentrating in multifamily and, more cautiously, office, while every other property type is being asked to fund the gap themselves.

This analysis reflects CRED iQ’s proprietary conduit new issue surveillance data for the periods indicated and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment, legal, or financial advice. Figures are subject to revision as additional deal data becomes available.


About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is a commercial real estate data and analytics platform providing loan surveillance, valuation, and risk analytics across CMBS, agency (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae), and private-label CRE loan portfolios. Our proprietary data covers conduit, single-asset/single-borrower, and CRE CLO transactions, supporting investors, servicers, and researchers with timely, granular market intelligence.

Bank Multifamily Loan Delinquencies Ease to 1.41% in Q2 2026, Why the Relief May Be Temporary

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Bank-held multifamily loan delinquencies eased to 1.41% in Q2 2026, down from a multi-year high of 1.47% in Q1, per CRED iQ’s analysis of FDIC data across all insured institutions. Banks’ total multifamily portfolios grew to $667.6 billion in the quarter, up 3.6% year-over-year though decelerating from Q1’s pace, and the dollar amount of delinquent loans fell too, to $9.41 billion from $9.78 billion. Early-stage delinquencies (30-89 days) dropped to 0.31% from 0.40%, but 90+ day delinquencies ticked up to 1.10% from 1.07%, and net charge-offs rose to an annualized 0.32%, more than double the 0.13% banks charged off for all of 2025. That combination, easing delinquency, rising realized losses, is consistent with a workout-driven cycle rather than a resolving one. Today’s rate is still roughly 6.7 times the 2019 low of 0.21%, though well below the 5.90% Global Financial Crisis peak.

What’s Driving the Losses? A Property-Level View From CRED iQ’s Loan Data

FDIC data shows losses rising but investors need to examine property-level financials to understand the root causes. CRED iQ’s own property-level income and expense data, securitized multifamily loans that reported updated financials in June 2026, fills that gap. At the median property, effective gross income grew just 0.6% while operating expenses grew 1.5%, about 2.5 times as fast. Net operating income grew only 0.2%. That median hides a wide split: 57% of properties saw expenses outpace income, and 48% saw NOI decline outright, close to a coin flip nationally. A property with softening NOI has less cushion to absorb a rate reset or a maturity refinance, a plausible link to the same loans eventually migrating into the 90+ day bucket, or getting resolved through a workout and a realized loss.

The pattern isn’t uniform. Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco show the weakest combination of trends nationally, below-average income growth paired with above-average expense growth, producing the sharpest NOI erosion in the sample. Several Sun Belt metros, including Dallas and Austin, look different: NOI softness there comes from weak income growth rather than rising costs, a demand-side story rather than a cost-side one.

CRED iQ’s property-level dataset reflects securitized multifamily loans, distinct from FDIC’s bank-held universe.

The Bottom Line

Q2 delivered the first genuinely mixed signal in an otherwise steady multifamily credit deterioration: the headline rate improved, but 90+ day delinquencies and charge-offs kept climbing. CRED iQ’s property data suggests why the relief may not last, expenses are still outrunning income for the median property, and NOI is flat to negative for roughly half the national multifamily book. The Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco pattern is worth watching heading into Q3 in particular, since it shows income and expense pressure compounding in the same markets rather than offsetting each other. Whether Q2 marks a real inflection point or a one-quarter pause depends on how both bank call reports and property fundamentals shape up next quarter.

Sources: CRED iQ analysis of all FDIC-insured institutions, multifamily residential real estate loans, Q1 2007 through Q2 2026; CRED iQ proprietary analysis of securitized multifamily loan-level property financials, reporting periods since June 2026.

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