1/3 of Maturing Apartment Debt Needs a Cash Infusion to Refinance

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October 15, 2026

After September’s rate hike, $6.8 billion of fresh equity stands between maturing multifamily loans and a refinance. Loans written at 2021 and 2022’s low coupons are the hardest hit.

20 Exchange Place, a 54-story, 767-unit apartment tower near Wall Street built in 1929, was 94% occupied in the second quarter, and its loan is current. But the $246 million Freddie Mac loan behind it carries a 4.01% coupon and matures in February 2027. The property’s 2025 net operating income of $15.5 million would support a new loan of about $183 million at today’s agency rates, leaving a gap of roughly $63 million. The borrower has been calling capital from investors as needed to cover operating shortfalls, according to servicer commentary.

That arithmetic is now common. CRED iQ re-sized every multifamily loan in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and commercial mortgage-backed securities deals maturing between October 2026 and December 2028, $136 billion in all, at current new-issue coupons plus September’s rate hike. Nearly one in four (23%) of those loans, and 31% of the balance, could not refinance without new equity. Borrowers would need to bring $6.8 billion to the table. The median shortfall is 15% of the loan, or about $25,000 per apartment.

What the Hike Did

The Secured Overnight Financing Rate jumped from 3.62% to 3.85% on Sept. 17. Passed through to permanent loan coupons, the hike pushed 178 more loans ($4.0 billion of balance) below a 1.25x coverage test and added $846 million to the equity gap. Each further 25 basis points adds roughly $1.0 billion more. Two more hikes would leave 39% of maturing multifamily debt short of a refinance.

Scenario	Coupon, conduit / Freddie / Fannie	Loans short	Balance short	Equity needed
Before Sept. hike	6.21% / 5.21% / 5.34%	21%	28%	$6.0B
After hike (+25 bp)	6.46% / 5.46% / 5.59%	23%	31%	$6.8B
One more (+50 bp)	6.71% / 5.71% / 5.84%	26%	35%	$7.7B
Two more (+75 bp)	6.96% / 5.96% / 6.09%	29%	39%	$8.8B
Three more (+100 bp)	7.21% / 6.21% / 6.34%	32%	42%	$9.8B

Rate scenarios: multifamily debt maturing October 2026 to December 2028 that needs new equity to refinance

The 2021-2022 Problem

The gap is concentrated in loans written at the bottom of the rate cycle. Loans originated in 2021 and 2022, with a median coupon of 3.35%, now face refinancing rates roughly two to three percentage points higher. Some 46% of them, and 57% of their balance, need new equity, against 15% of the loans written in 2016 to 2018, which had years of rent growth to catch up with higher rates. Income is the other half of the story: loans that clear the test have grown net operating income a median 31% since underwriting, while those that fall short have seen it drop a median 12%.

Originated	Maturing balance	Median coupon	Loans short	Balance short	Equity needed
2016-2018	$70.1B	4.37%	15%	19%	$2.6B
2019-2020	$10.3B	3.46%	33%	46%	$0.8B
2021-2022	$18.5B	3.35%	46%	57%	$1.9B
2023-2025	$21.0B	5.78%	38%	44%	$1.4B

By origination year: maturing multifamily loans that need new equity after the hike

Where the Gap Is Widest

Among the largest markets, Western and Sunbelt metros lead. In San Francisco, 70% of maturing multifamily debt falls short; in Atlanta, 55%; in Denver, 51%. Chicago (13%) and Los Angeles (24%) are at the other end.

Metro	Maturing balance	Loans short	Balance short	Equity needed
San Francisco	$4.0B	47%	70%	$603M
Atlanta	$3.9B	44%	55%	$398M
Denver	$3.9B	51%	51%	$368M
Phoenix	$3.9B	40%	46%	$299M
Dallas-Fort Worth	$5.2B	34%	42%	$478M
Seattle	$3.6B	32%	40%	$223M
New York	$10.8B	33%	39%	$739M
Houston	$3.7B	30%	37%	$200M
Washington, D.C.	$4.4B	31%	33%	$231M
San Diego	$3.2B	24%	33%	$140M
Los Angeles	$8.4B	25%	24%	$352M
Chicago	$4.1B	17%	13%	$68M

Largest metros: maturing multifamily debt that needs new equity after the hike

New York’s Park West Village shows how fast a gap can open. The 850-unit property’s loan, split across seven conduit deals, was underwritten at 1.34x coverage; by year-end 2025 coverage was 0.61x as expenses rose, according to servicer commentary. It was modified by the special servicer last November and matures in August 2027.

The Takeaway

Most maturing multifamily loans still refinance on their own. But for the 2021 and 2022 class, a refinance now means a check, and every additional hike makes it bigger. Expect more paydowns, extensions and rescue capital through 2028.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026. Multifamily loans in Fannie Mae DUS MBS, Freddie Mac K and SB deals, and conduit and fixed-rate SASB CMBS maturing October 2026 to December 2028; floating-rate SASB, CRE CLO and co-op loans excluded. Refinance sized at 1.25x debt service coverage on a 30-year amortization at the average coupon on 2026 multifamily new issuance (6.21% conduit and SASB, 5.21% Freddie Mac, 5.34% Fannie Mae) plus 25 basis points, using 2025 net operating income. September 2026 numbers are preliminary.

Insurance Is Taking a Bigger Bite Out of Apartment Revenue

By

Liam Mulcahy

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October 8, 2026

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In 2019, a Louisiana apartment property financed in a CMBS or Freddie K deal spent about $4.77 on insurance for every $100 of revenue it collected. By 2025, that figure was $9.42, and that is after premiums fell last year.

That is the shape of the apartment insurance story. After five straight years of increases, insurance costs on apartment properties fell 2.2% in 2025, according to CRED iQ’s same-store analysis of property operating statements. That followed a 28.5% jump in 2023. But the relief came off a much higher base: apartment insurance costs are still more than double their 2019 level.

The pressure has clearly eased. In 2023, 46% of apartment properties saw their premiums rise more than 20%. In 2025, 24% did, and 36% paid less than the year before.

The Sunbelt Turned First

The markets with the sharpest run-up are the ones now getting relief. Florida apartment premiums rose 2.5-fold between 2019 and 2024, including a 46% jump in 2023 alone. In 2025 they fell 9.8%. Texas apartments fell 8.4% and Louisiana apartments 10.5%. Nearly two-thirds of Florida apartment properties paid less than a year earlier, as did 57% in Texas and 58% in Louisiana.

The decline has continued into 2026. In the first half of the year, 59% of apartment properties paid less for insurance than in the first half of 2025, up from 38% a year earlier. In the Sunbelt, 72% paid less, and the typical premium fell 11%.

	2023	2024	2025
Louisiana apartments	262	265	237
Florida apartments	239	255	230
Texas apartments	231	243	223
California apartments	205	236	251
New York apartments	166	192	201
Sunbelt apartments	223	239	221
Coastal metro apartments	187	216	226
All apartments	199	220	215

Same-store apartment insurance cost index (2019 = 100)

The Coasts Are Still Climbing

Coastal apartment owners have not shared in the relief. Premiums on apartments in major coastal metros rose 4.8% in 2025, and California apartments rose 6.3%. California has now passed Florida on cumulative growth since 2019, with an index of 251 against Florida’s 230, and coastal apartments overall (226) have passed the Sunbelt (221).

Rents Never Kept Up

The bigger problem for owners is that revenue did not keep pace. On the same properties, apartment revenue per unit rose 27% from 2019 to 2025, from $14,210 to $19,292 a year. Insurance per unit rose 115%, from $339 to $778. Nationally, insurance now takes $4.02 of every $100 of apartment revenue, up from $2.39 in 2019. Insurance outran rent in every one of the 30 states we measured, led by Louisiana, California, Oregon, Washington and Texas.

State	2019	2025	Change
Louisiana	$4.77	$9.42	+97%
California	$1.63	$3.12	+91%
Oregon	$1.49	$2.77	+86%
Texas	$2.92	$5.37	+84%
Washington	$1.60	$2.95	+84%
Georgia	$2.34	$4.07	+74%
Florida	$3.21	$5.55	+73%
New York	$2.60	$4.37	+68%
Michigan	$2.71	$3.39	+25%
United States	$2.39	$4.02	+68%

Insurance cost per $100 of apartment revenue, same properties

2025 Was a Turning Point

Last year was the first since 2019 in which apartment revenue grew faster than insurance: revenue rose 1.4% while insurance costs fell about 2%. In the Sunbelt, apartment revenue was flat, but insurance fell 7.2%, or $65 million. As a result, net operating income fell 1.4% instead of 2.1%.

For lenders, the Sunbelt relief is real and arrives as loans head toward 2027 and 2028 refinancings. But insurance costs for Sunbelt apartments are still more than double their 2019 level, and on the coasts they are still rising. The spike is over. The higher costs stayed.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, October 2026. Same-store analysis of property operating statements for apartment properties securing CMBS and Freddie K loans: each year compares the same properties’ annual insurance cost and revenue with the prior year, chained to 2019 = 100. 2025 and first-half 2026 figures are preliminary.

Postseason CMBS: Does Good Baseball Mean Good Real Estate?

By

Liam Mulcahy

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October 1, 2026

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Both Chicago teams made October. Chicago’s office towers didn’t. How commercial real estate is holding up in the 11 playoff metros.

In July, the $536 million loan on Chicago’s Aon Center reached maturity and wasn’t repaid. The tower, appraised at $824 million when the loan was securitized, is now valued at $195 million. A three-year extension request “was unequivocally denied,” according to servicer commentary.

Chicago is the weakest real estate market in this year’s postseason. As of August, 25.3% of Chicago’s outstanding CMBS balance was delinquent or in special servicing, according to CRED iQ. That is the highest of the 11 playoff metros and up 4.7 percentage points in a year.

Nationally, the CMBS distress rate was 10.9% in August, down from 11.5% a year earlier. Preliminary September numbers point to a similar 10.8%. The steady headline masks office, which accounts for 45.5% of distressed balance and whose distress rate climbed to 16.0%. Office is the top source of distress in eight of the 11 playoff metros.

Metro	Team(s)	Distress Rate	Change vs. Aug 2025	Primary Driver
San Diego	Padres	0.3%	−0.8 pts	None (all types under 2%)
Boston	Red Sox	5.6%	+0.1 pts	Mixed-use / life science
Tampa	Rays	6.0%	−1.4 pts	Retail
Atlanta	Braves	7.5%	−6.7 pts	Office
New York	Yankees	9.6%	−2.9 pts	Office
Los Angeles	Dodgers	11.8%	+3.5 pts	Office
Houston	Astros	16.0%	+3.3 pts	Office
Philadelphia	Phillies	16.3%	−0.2 pts	Office
Milwaukee	Brewers	22.4%	+2.7 pts	Office
Cleveland	Guardians	22.5%	+2.4 pts	Office
Chicago	Cubs, White Sox	25.3%	+4.7 pts	Office
U.S. CMBS		10.9%	−0.5 pts	Office

CMBS distress by playoff metro, August 2026

The bottom of the bracket

Cleveland (22.5%) and Milwaukee (22.4%) join Chicago at the bottom. In Cleveland, $414 million of distressed debt sits within a mile of Progressive Field, led by Key Center, in special servicing since 2020. Milwaukee’s distress centers on Southridge Mall, where the value has fallen 74%.

The middle innings

Philadelphia (16.3%) is weighed down by three loans on Market Street West, at 1500, 1700 and 1818 Market, totaling $779 million and 40% of the metro’s distress. Houston (16.0%) rose 3.3 points as One & Three Allen Center, a $470 million loan on a 71%-occupied complex, moved to special servicing and six apartment loans became distressed this summer. Los Angeles (11.8%) jumped in August when the $1.1 billion ICON/Hollywood Media Portfolio loan transferred ahead of maturity; 20 LA loans totaling $2.5 billion became distressed this summer.

The comeback stories

New York’s rate fell 2.9 points to 9.6% as $6.1 billion of loans cured, including 1211 Avenue of the Americas ($1.035 billion) and One New York Plaza ($810 million). Worldwide Plaza, with its value down 74%, remains the biggest problem. Atlanta fell to 7.5% from 14.2%, helped by the payoff of a $580 million hotel portfolio loan.

The top seeds

San Diego is the cleanest market in the postseason at 0.3% distressed, with the Hotel del Coronado and a 98%-occupied Fashion Valley mall among its largest loans. In Tampa (6.0%), one asset, the 27%-occupied Westfield Countryside mall, accounts for 62% of distress. Boston (5.6%) is dominated by a single life-science loan that remains current.

The takeaway

The national rate is an average of very different markets. Midwestern office cores are still deteriorating, New York is healing, and in the healthiest cities a few buildings decide the score. For lenders, the question isn’t who wins the pennant. It’s which loans come due next.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics, August 2026. Conduit and SASB/SBLL CMBS. Distress rate is the share of outstanding balance that is delinquent or in special servicing. September 2026 figures are preliminary.

Office Special Servicing Hits a New High as More Loans Transfer Before Default

By

Liam Mulcahy

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September 24, 2026

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Office distress reaches new highs. The office CMBS delinquency rate reached 13.2% in August 2026, the highest reading since at least 2019 and up from 8.1% in July 2024. That is roughly 1.6 times the 8.2% rate across all property types. The figure includes performing matured loans; excluding them, office delinquency stands at 9.8%. The special servicing rate climbed to 15.7%, also the highest since at least 2019, up from 14.9% a year earlier and 10.6% in July 2024. The figures cover $189.6 billion of office debt across conduit, single-asset single-borrower and CRE CLO deals.

The climb slowed, then resumed. Most of the increase came between mid-2024 and mid-2025. From September 2025 through July 2026, office delinquency held between 11.5% and 12.5% before jumping in August. Of the deals that have reported so far in September, delinquency is running above 14% and special servicing above 16%. Conduit office remains the weakest segment at 14.4% delinquent and 18.5% in special servicing, compared with 10.7% and 11.5% for single-asset single-borrower office. Maturity remains the main driver: 71% of distressed office balance is tied to a failed or imminent refinancing rather than missed payments.

Distress is arriving earlier. Over the past 12 months, 51% of office loans transferred to special servicing were still current at transfer, a median of about 11 months ahead of maturity, up from 42% in the prior 12 months. Borrowers and master servicers are increasingly moving loans before a payment is missed or a balloon date passes. One SoHo Square, backed by roughly $469 million of CMBS notes, transferred in late August while current, nearly two years before its 2028 maturity.

The writing was on the wall. Whether that is premature shows up in what happened next. CRED iQ tracked the 93 office loans that transferred while current and ahead of maturity between August 2024 and August 2025. Through August 2026, 72% went 60 or more days delinquent or matured without paying off at some point. As of August, 43% were still delinquent or matured unpaid, and only 15% had returned to the master servicer and were current. Among loans already delinquent at transfer, the share that reached serious delinquency was 92%. A loan that looks healthy at transfer has proven only modestly safer than one that has already stopped paying.

Full buildings are not immune. Several failed refinancings involve fully leased, single-tenant properties. Crossroads III in Sunnyvale, a $209 million loan on a 100% leased property with Apple as its largest tenant, was extended once, went to special servicing in August and received a notice of default on September 1. In Rockville, Maryland, the $138 million GSK R&D Centre loan transferred ahead of its 2027 maturity as its sole tenant vacated, even though the property still reports full occupancy.

Large loans are the exception. Among current-at-transfer loans under $100 million, 74% went on to default at some point, and 11% were back with the master servicer by August. Among loans of $100 million or more, the default rate was lower at 63%, and about a third had returned to the master servicer by August, some after a period of default. Willis Tower and 1211 Avenue of the Americas both transferred while current and have since returned to the master servicer. For larger loans, an early transfer appears to work more as an entry point to a restructuring than as a precursor to foreclosure.

Why no one is waiting. The 2015 and 2016 vintages explain the caution. Ten-year office loans from those years paid off at maturity at 47% and 44% by balance, compared with 79% and 76% for other property types. Distress in the 2016 office vintage jumped 35 percentage points in a year to 51% of balance. In downtown Indianapolis, Salesforce Tower and PNC Center, both originated on the same day in August 2016, matured on the same day, September 1. PNC Center went to special servicing days earlier and is now non-performing matured; Salesforce Tower is performing matured.

What comes next. About $39 billion of office CMBS matures over the next 12 months. Of that, $13.9 billion is not yet distressed but already shows warning signs: debt service coverage below 1.25x, occupancy down 10 or more points from securitization, or a recent watchlist addition. The largest include 3 Bryant Park ($1.13 billion, watchlisted in May) and 280 Park Avenue ($1.08 billion, debt service coverage of 0.72x). If the past two years are a guide, many of these loans will reach special servicing well before they miss a payment.

Data reflects CRED iQ’s coverage of conduit, single-asset single-borrower and CRE CLO office loans as of August 2026 remittances. Delinquency includes performing matured loans. Outcomes for loans that left reporting are inferred from their last reported status. Initial maturity dates on floating-rate loans with extension options may overstate near-term maturities.

About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is a commercial real estate data and analytics platform providing loan-level insight across CMBS, agency and private-label CRE loan portfolios, helping lenders, investors and servicers monitor performance, valuation and risk.

CRED iQ Launches PRISM: Unit-Level Multifamily Rent Analytics

By

Liam Mulcahy

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September 22, 2026

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New API-first product structures asking rents, floor plans, square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and amenities for over one million multifamily properties, refreshed weekly

PHILADELPHIA, PA — CRED iQ, the commercial real estate data and analytics company, today announced PRISM, a multifamily unit analytics product that turns publicly advertised rental listings into structured, property-level data. PRISM covers more than one million deduplicated multifamily properties drawn from more than 1.5 million public listings, refreshes weekly, and is delivered through a REST API, bulk data feeds, and an MCP server for AI workflows.

PRISM addresses a familiar problem for appraisers, lenders, investors, and developers: multifamily rent comparables still get assembled by hand, one listing site at a time. PRISM does that work at national scale and returns the result as clean tables keyed to a single property ID. For each property, subscribers receive public asking rents by unit type, from studios through four-bedroom units, with minimum, maximum, and midpoint values; floor plans with bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage, and unit counts; availability and lease terms as published; structured amenities and ratings; and HUD enrichment including year built, total units, inspection scores, and subsidy flags. A source map records every listing that contributed to a record, so each rent can be traced back to where it was publicly advertised.

“PRISM is a benchmarking dataset. It shows what the market is asking, unit by unit, and hands it to you as an API so your appraisal, underwriting, or market study can move at the speed of your own workflow,” said Michael Haas, Chief Executive Officer of CRED iQ. “PRISM was designed around a set of principles that our clients, prospects and our own analysts believe the multifamily industry needs.”

PRISM extends CRED iQ’s existing coverage of the securitized commercial real estate market into the broader multifamily rental universe. The product is built on the same API-first architecture CRED iQ has used since 2019 to deliver loan, property, and valuation data to lenders, investors, servicers, rating agencies, and researchers.

Availability: PRISM is available now in early access. Professionals and firms can request an API trial at pages.cred-iq.com/prism. Delivery options include a REST API, scheduled bulk data feeds, and an MCP server for use with AI agents. Enterprise and data-licensing inquiries can be directed to info@cred-iq.com.

About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is the enterprise data and intelligence platform powering the securitized commercial real estate market — spanning CMBS, SASB, CRE CLO, and GSE/Agency Multifamily. Delivered via web platform, API, bulk feeds, and MCP server, CRED iQ is the data provider of choice for institutional market participants and the canonical data layer for AI-driven CRE workflows. Learn more at www.cred-iq.com.

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CRED iQ
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State of Conduit CMBS: Multifamily and Office Stay Levered, While Other Property Types Provide More Equity

By

Liam Mulcahy

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September 17, 2026

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The latest conduit CMBS data reveal a lending market that has grown more selective, not more cautious. Rates broadly eased over the past year, yet borrowers in most property types are being asked to bring more equity to the table than they were twelve months ago. Multifamily and office are the exceptions, for different reasons, and increasingly the exceptions that define the cycle.

Source: CRED iQ, conduit new issue data, June–August 2025 vs. June–August 2026. Figures are note-amount-weighted averages.

Multifamily is the sector where issuers extended more credit on better terms. LTV climbed to 62.0%, up 2.2 points and the highest of any property type, while the rate on those loans fell the most in the entire sample, down a full half-point to 6.0%. Debt yield actually dropped slightly, meaning borrowers are covering less cushion per dollar borrowed even as leverage rose. That is about as clean a vote of confidence as a lending market gives.

Office also gained leverage, but the mechanics look different. LTV rose 3.3 points, to 49.5%, yet DSCR fell by more than two tenths of a turn, to 1.94x, and debt yield ticked up rather than down. Issuers are willing to lend more against office collateral, but they’re pricing that leverage with thinner coverage and a smaller margin for error, a bet that office cash flows have stabilized enough to underwrite more aggressively, not a wholesale return of confidence in the sector.

Everywhere else, the ask went the other direction, and more sharply. Retail’s LTV fell 10.2 points, to 47.8%, while its debt yield jumped 8.1 points, to 20.3%, the single largest swing in the table. Self-storage and industrial told a similar story: leverage down 6 to 10 points, debt yield and DSCR both up. None of these sectors are in distress; DSCR actually improved in each case. But issuers are structuring deals that require meaningfully more sponsor equity than they did a year ago, even as the underlying cost of debt got a little cheaper.

Hotel remains the market’s most watched holdout. Its debt yield, at 22.4%, is the highest of any category by a wide margin, and it rose again this year even as rate and LTV both eased at the edges. Lenders are still pricing in more downside than the headline rate suggests.

The blended LTV held flat at 55.6% both years, but that’s an artifact of mix, not stability. Multifamily’s share of loan count rose from roughly 31% to 43%. Strip that shift out, and the underlying message is unambiguous: capital is concentrating in multifamily and, more cautiously, office, while every other property type is being asked to fund the gap themselves.

This analysis reflects CRED iQ’s proprietary conduit new issue surveillance data for the periods indicated and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment, legal, or financial advice. Figures are subject to revision as additional deal data becomes available.

About CRED iQ

CRED iQ is a commercial real estate data and analytics platform providing loan surveillance, valuation, and risk analytics across CMBS, agency (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae), and private-label CRE loan portfolios. Our proprietary data covers conduit, single-asset/single-borrower, and CRE CLO transactions, supporting investors, servicers, and researchers with timely, granular market intelligence.

Bank Multifamily Loan Delinquencies Ease to 1.41% in Q2 2026, Why the Relief May Be Temporary

By

Liam Mulcahy

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September 11, 2026

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Bank-held multifamily loan delinquencies eased to 1.41% in Q2 2026, down from a multi-year high of 1.47% in Q1, per CRED iQ’s analysis of FDIC data across all insured institutions. Banks’ total multifamily portfolios grew to $667.6 billion in the quarter, up 3.6% year-over-year though decelerating from Q1’s pace, and the dollar amount of delinquent loans fell too, to $9.41 billion from $9.78 billion. Early-stage delinquencies (30-89 days) dropped to 0.31% from 0.40%, but 90+ day delinquencies ticked up to 1.10% from 1.07%, and net charge-offs rose to an annualized 0.32%, more than double the 0.13% banks charged off for all of 2025. That combination, easing delinquency, rising realized losses, is consistent with a workout-driven cycle rather than a resolving one. Today’s rate is still roughly 6.7 times the 2019 low of 0.21%, though well below the 5.90% Global Financial Crisis peak.

What’s Driving the Losses? A Property-Level View From CRED iQ’s Loan Data

FDIC data shows losses rising but investors need to examine property-level financials to understand the root causes. CRED iQ’s own property-level income and expense data, securitized multifamily loans that reported updated financials in June 2026, fills that gap. At the median property, effective gross income grew just 0.6% while operating expenses grew 1.5%, about 2.5 times as fast. Net operating income grew only 0.2%. That median hides a wide split: 57% of properties saw expenses outpace income, and 48% saw NOI decline outright, close to a coin flip nationally. A property with softening NOI has less cushion to absorb a rate reset or a maturity refinance, a plausible link to the same loans eventually migrating into the 90+ day bucket, or getting resolved through a workout and a realized loss.

The pattern isn’t uniform. Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco show the weakest combination of trends nationally, below-average income growth paired with above-average expense growth, producing the sharpest NOI erosion in the sample. Several Sun Belt metros, including Dallas and Austin, look different: NOI softness there comes from weak income growth rather than rising costs, a demand-side story rather than a cost-side one.

CRED iQ’s property-level dataset reflects securitized multifamily loans, distinct from FDIC’s bank-held universe.

The Bottom Line

Q2 delivered the first genuinely mixed signal in an otherwise steady multifamily credit deterioration: the headline rate improved, but 90+ day delinquencies and charge-offs kept climbing. CRED iQ’s property data suggests why the relief may not last, expenses are still outrunning income for the median property, and NOI is flat to negative for roughly half the national multifamily book. The Denver, Seattle, and San Francisco pattern is worth watching heading into Q3 in particular, since it shows income and expense pressure compounding in the same markets rather than offsetting each other. Whether Q2 marks a real inflection point or a one-quarter pause depends on how both bank call reports and property fundamentals shape up next quarter.

Sources: CRED iQ analysis of all FDIC-insured institutions, multifamily residential real estate loans, Q1 2007 through Q2 2026; CRED iQ proprietary analysis of securitized multifamily loan-level property financials, reporting periods since June 2026.

CRE CLO Distress Accelerates in August

By

Liam Mulcahy

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September 4, 2026

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The CMBS Market Remains Weighed Down by CRE CLO and SASB Loans Issued in 2021 and 2022

CRE CLO’s distress rate jumped from 19 percent in July to 28 percent in August, the sharpest one-month move of any deal type this year. SASB has held near 22 percent since June. Both trace to the same two origination years: 2021 and 2022 vintage loans now carry $3 billion of CRE CLO’s special-servicing balance and $1.7 billion of SASB’s, against $27 billion and $17 billion outstanding. In both cases the distress sits in a handful of large, identifiable deals rather than spread across the market.

The chart below puts these two deal types in context against the rest of the securitized universe. Conduit, Freddie Mac, and SFR have barely moved in eight months, each still under five percent. CRE CLO and SASB are the only categories that have crossed into double digits — a divergence specific to 2021-and-2022 vintage collateral, not the broader lending market.

Distress rate by securitization type, loans issued 2021–2022. Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics.

CRE CLO: A Single Portfolio Is Doing Most of the Damage

FSRIA 2021-FL3 is the largest contributor, with $353 million of multifamily collateral now in special servicing across seven loans. It has added a new default roughly every eight weeks throughout 2026, and August brought two more: River Crossing at Roswell ($49 million) and Grace Abernathy Apartments in Sandy Springs, Georgia ($42 million), both tied to 2026 balloon maturities. Add the July transfer of 415 Premier Apartments in Evanston, Illinois ($40 million), and this one deal has moved $131 million into distress since spring.

ARCLO 2022-FL1, a similar Sunbelt bridge-loan CLO, added The Residences at Medical in San Antonio ($27 million) and Pebblebrook Apartments in Redlands, California ($12 million) this cycle for $210 million of newly distressed collateral in August alone. Five deals now account for 38 percent of all CRE CLO special-servicing balance, and the ten largest deals hold 58 percent. Texas, Florida, and Georgia alone carry 44 percent of the distressed balance — bridge loans underwritten on rent growth that never showed up before their floating-rate plans ran out of runway.

SASB: Four Office and Lab Portfolios Carry Two-Thirds of the Category

SASB’s distress is concentrated instead in four single-borrower office and lab deals worth 64 percent of the category’s $1.7 billion balance. BXHPP 2021-FILM, a $525 million loan against seven Hollywood studio and office properties, transferred in July. ALEN 2021-ACEN ($203 million, Three Allen Center, Houston) and LIFE 2021-BMR ($190 million, life-science space across Cambridge, San Diego, and the Bay Area) both transferred earlier this year.

The newest addition, BSREP 2021-DC, transferred August 10: a $162 million loan against eight Washington, D.C.-area office buildings. Its size has roughly offset whatever balance SASB resolved elsewhere this summer, which is why the rate hasn’t moved. California, New York, and D.C. now hold two-thirds of SASB’s distressed balance.

What It Means Going Forward

Office and mixed-use loans maturing over the next nine months are pricing 170 to 180 basis points above their in-place notes, the widest refinancing gap of any property type — the market BSREP and LIFE will resolve into. CRE CLO’s Sunbelt loans face the same wall from a different angle: floating-rate plans built on 2021 and 2022 rent growth that never materialized.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary loan-level analytics. CRE CLO and SASB loans originated 2021–2022, deduplicated to unique loans from property-level records and cross-referenced against CRED iQ’s August 2026 distressed-loan alert log. Distress = special servicing or non-performing/delinquent status, as reported through the September 3, 2026 data pull.

Property Types Feeling the August Heat

By

Liam Mulcahy

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August 27, 2026

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Industrial, hospitality, retail, and self storage post $4.6 billion in new distress

The CRED iQ distress rate bottomed at 10.11% in April and rose for three consecutive months, reaching 10.78% in July. The special servicing rate followed the same pattern, climbing from 9.73% to 10.02% over that stretch, and the delinquency rate moved from 8.08% to 8.67%. Early August figures point to a fourth straight increase across all three measures, though the month is still being finalized.

Property Type Analysis

Industrial produced the single largest distressed loan in the entire report. Project JR, a warehouse and logistics property which has been converted to a data center in Carrollton, Texas, was originally structured with extension options and the borrower exercised the first of three options in June to push out its maturity. Midland, the servicer, nonetheless initially reported the loan as Performing Matured in early August; that status was later revised to Current. Across six pari passu notes (CONE 2024-DFW1), the loan totals $687.1 million. Industrial distress overall reached $1.41 billion across 101 severe alerts this month.

Hospitality distress centered on two large, name-brand assets. The Hyatt Regency New Orleans, a $325 million loan (NOHT 2019-HNLA), transferred to special servicing on a payment default — the largest new special servicer transfer of the month across any property type. The Ritz-Carlton Sarasota, a $362.5 million loan across four notes (BAMLL 2024-BHP), is now Newly Delinquent (Performing Matured) after missing its September maturity while continuing to pay. Hospitality distress overall reached $1.17 billion across 88 severe alerts this month.

Retail distress this month clustered in regional and outlet malls, coast to coast. Augusta Mall in Georgia, a combined $155.2 million across two notes, moved to Non-Performing Matured status on a balloon payment default. Fresno Fashion Fair Mall, $140 million combined across two notes, and Harlem USA in Manhattan, $108 million combined, both transferred to special servicing on imminent maturity default. Coral Ridge Mall in Iowa ($61.7 million) and The Shoppes at South Bay in Torrance, California ($37 million) both went newly late. Grove City Premium Outlets in Pennsylvania and Gulfport Outlet Mall in Mississippi, tied to the same MSC 2015-UBS8 deal, added $64 million combined. Retail distress overall reached $951.4 million across 89 severe alerts this month.

Self storage distress traced almost entirely to two national portfolio operators. A Prime Storage portfolio securitized in BMARK 2023-V4, $57.9 million across 91 properties spanning New York, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Connecticut, Arizona, Rhode Island, and Virginia, registered as newly late in the same cycle. A separate U-Haul portfolio in CD 2017-CD6, $23.6 million across 39 properties in more than a dozen states, did the same. Together the two portfolios account for the bulk of self storage’s $124 million in distressed balance this month, in a property type generally treated as close to recession-resistant.

Market Context

A limited refinancing environment combined with elevated interest rates continues to push loans past maturity across property types, not only the office and multifamily loans that typically dominate distress coverage.

Source: CRED iQ Property Alerts, August 2026. “Distress” includes Newly Late, Newly Delinquent (all maturity statuses), Delinquency Degradation (all stages), and New Special Servicer Transfer alert categories; excludes New Watchlist Loan additions.

The Maturity Wall Is Getting Taller

By

Liam Mulcahy

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August 21, 2026

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Refinancing costs are rising sharply on the $100 billion in loans coming due over the next nine months

More than 2,600 conduit and SBLL CMBS loans, carrying a combined outstanding balance over $100 billion, mature over the next nine months. The balance-weighted distress rate across that pool is 5.55 percent — a manageable-looking average that hides which property type is really under stress, how concentrated the balance is geographically, and which loans that look fine today are headed for a far harder refinancing.

Multifamily Is Under Stress and Relief Isn’t Coming

Office carries the highest distress rate of any major property type in this maturing pool, at 9.4 percent on $23.86 billion — unsurprising. More telling: multifamily, at $5.01 billion, shows a 7.5 percent distress rate — higher than retail’s 3.5 percent and higher than hotel’s 4.4 percent. Multifamily is conventionally treated as the safer bet, especially set against retail’s long-running “death of the mall” narrative. In this pool, it’s the other way around.

Refinancing Costs Are Landing Far Harder on Some Property Types Than Others

Distress rates capture what’s already gone wrong. They don’t capture what’s coming. Across office, hotel, industrial, retail, mixed-use and multifamily debt maturing in this window, the average note rate on those loans today is 5.44 percent. Loans actually originated between May and August of this year — the real cost of replacing that debt — are pricing at a loan-weighted 6.58 percent, a gap of about 114 basis points that applies whether or not a loan is currently flagged as distressed.

Property Type	Rate on Maturing Loan	New-Origination Rate	Gap
Mixed-Use	5.04%	6.82%	+178 bps
Retail	4.77%	6.50%	+173 bps
Office	5.14%	6.86%	+172 bps
Multifamily	5.00%	5.65%	+65 bps
Industrial	5.93%	6.52%	+59 bps
Hotel	6.17%	6.50%	+32 bps

That gap isn’t uniform, and it doesn’t track with where distress is showing up today. Mixed-use and retail — two of the cleanest performers on trailing distress — face the widest resets, at +178 and +173 basis points; office is close behind at +172. Hotel, despite carrying the highest current rate of any major property type, faces the smallest gap, just +32 bps, because those loans were already priced closer to today’s market. A loan with no problems today can still walk into a materially higher payment the moment it refinances. Call it shadow distress: a risk hiding inside this wall’s currently “clean” loans that today’s distress numbers alone will never show.

A Fifth of the Entire Maturity Wall Sits in One Metro

Just 10 of the 371 metro areas in this data account for 57.8 percent of the full $87.8 billion balance. New York-Newark-Jersey City alone is $15.87 billion — 18.1 percent of the national total. Los Angeles ($7.81B) and San Francisco ($4.70B) round out the top three. The map below shows the concentration: a wall sitting hard in a handful of gateway markets, not spread evenly across the country.

CMBS Maturity Wall — balance maturing by metro

The Maturity Wall Has Many Large Bricks

A single retail property in Honolulu carries a $1.73 billion loan maturing in June 2027 — larger than the combined balance maturing in most other metros in this data. It’s almost certainly Ala Moana Center, given its scale and financing history. That’s the largest single loan in the entire maturity wall, but it isn’t the only brick this size.

A $1.69 billion office loan on Binney Street in Cambridge, Massachusetts — in the heart of the Kendall Square life-science and lab-office corridor — matures in May 2027. A $1.52 billion retail loan on Fallbrook Avenue in Los Angeles matures in March 2027. In New York, three trophy office towers on Sixth Avenue and Park Avenue alone account for well over $1.4 billion in maturing balance across three different months: 1290 Avenue of the Americas ($673 million, November 2026), 1095 Avenue of the Americas ($544 million, February 2027), and 280 Park Avenue ($430 million, September 2026).

These loans aren’t uniformly healthy, either. 280 Park Avenue is already showing real strain, while its Sixth Avenue counterparts and Ala Moana Center are considered comfortable performers today — though comfortable now is exactly the kind of loan the shadow distress problem above is about. Whatever shape each loan is in today, its outcome — refinanced smoothly, extended, or handed back — is large enough to move the numbers for its entire metro and, in some cases, for the property type nationally. A reminder that a handful of single-asset loans can swing those numbers on their own, and that the loan-level detail is where the real risk in this maturity wall actually lives.

What’s Actually Driving the Worst Pockets of Distress

January 2027’s distressed balance is spread across four office loans in four separate gateway metros — New York, Washington, Seattle, and San Francisco — all stressed in the same 30-day window. That’s not one bad loan; it’s an office-specific pattern hitting four of the country’s largest office markets at once. September 2026 tells a different story: a lodging portfolio and a Chicago office loan are fully distressed, but a $699.7 million New York office loan, only 10.4 percent distressed, still contributes more dollars just by being large — size and distress rate both doing real work.

The Takeaway

The 5.55 percent headline distress rate is a reasonable-looking average built from pieces that disagree: a national number that’s really a New York number in disguise, a property type reputation that doesn’t hold up in this cohort, and a refinancing reset hitting some property types far harder than others — one that will eventually catch today’s clean, performing loans too.

Source: CRED iQ proprietary CMBS loan-level analytics. Conduit and SBLL deal types only. Loans maturing September 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027.